




# Breaking virtualization by switching to Virtual 8086 mode

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**HITBSECCONF2010**  
**A M S T E R D A M**

29th June - 2nd July 2010  
<http://conference.hackinthebox.nl/>

# Agenda

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 **Virtualization : big picture**

 **Attack surface analysis**

 **The need for new tools**

 **Introducing Virtual 8086 mode**

 **• Practical fuzzing with vm86()**

# Virtualization : time to care !

Market shares

Definitions

# Virtualization : market shares

Source : Forrester Research 2009

**78%** of companies have production servers virtualized.

**20%** only have virtualized servers.

# Virtualization : market shares

Source : Forrester Research 2009

VMWare is present in 98% of the  
companies.

Microsoft virtualization products are used  
by 17%.

Citrix/Xen is used by 10%.

## Bottom line...

Virtualization software are so widespread that they have become more attractive targets than say web, mail or dns servers !

There is a lower variety too !

# Definitions

# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Virtualization**

**Virtualization** is the name given to the simulation with higher level components, of lower level components.

**NOTE:** Virtualization of applications (as opposed to full Oses) is out of topic.




# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Virtual Machine**

**A virtual machine (VM) is : "an efficient, isolated duplicate of a real machine".**

**-- Gerald J. Popek and Robert P. Goldberg (1974).  
"Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third  
Generation Architectures", Communications of the  
ACM.**

# Paravirtualization



# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Paravirtualization**


Requires the modification of the guest  
Oses (eg: Xen, UML, Qemu with kqemu,  
VMWare Workstation with VMWare Tools).

Opposed to « full virtualization ».

# Virtualization : Definitions

There are two types of virtualizations :  
Virtual Machine Monitors (or **Hypervisors**)  
of **type I** and **type II**.

# Type I Hypervisor




# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Hypervisors of type I**

Run on bare metal (eg: Xen, Hyper-V, VMWare ESX).

# Type II hypervisor




# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Hypervisors of type II**

Run as a process inside a host OS to virtualize guests Oses (eg: Qemu, Virtualbox, VMWare Workstation, Parallels).



# Hardware assisted virtualization



# Hardware assisted virtualization


- Takes advantage of AMD-V On Intel VT-x CPU extensions for virtualization.
- x64 Only.
- The hypervisor is running in « ring -1 ».
- Much like the NX bit : requires the motherboard to support it and activation in the BIOS.

# Virtualization : Definitions

## **Isolation**

Isolation of the userland part of the OS to simulate independant machines (eg: Linux-Vservers, Solaris « Zones », BSD « jails », OpenVZ under GNU/Linux).

# Isolation



# Attack surface analysis

---

Depending on your perspective...

What are the risks ?

Where to attack ?

# Privilege escalation on the host

VMware Tools HGFS Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

(<http://labs.iddefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=712>)

# Privilege escalation on the Guest

**CVE-2009-2267 « Mishandled exception on page fault  
in VMware » Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes**

# Attacking other guests

Vmare workstation guest isolation weaknesses (clipboard transfer)

<http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5GP021FKKO.html>



# DoS (Host + Guests)

**CVE-2007-4591 CVE-2007-4593 (bad  
ioctl crashing the Host+Guests)**

# Escape to host

**Rafal Wojtczuk (Invisible things, BHUS  
2008)**

**IDEFENSE VMware Workstation Shared  
Folders Directory Traversal Vulnerability  
(CVE-2007-1744)**

# Attack surface analysis : usage

Hosting two companies on the same hardware is very common (shared hosting).

Getting a shell on the same machine as a given target may therefor be a matter of paying a few euros a month.

# Attack surface : conclusion

Owning the Host OS from the Guest is practical : security through virtualization is a failure.

Seemingly minor bugs (local, DoS) do matter : virtualization amplifies consequences.

**The need for dedicated  
methodologies and tools**

# The need for new tools : example

How to dynamically test a virtual Hard  
Drive ?

# How to dynamically test a virtual Hard Drive ? Naive approach

Standard API :

```
ssize_t read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count);  
ssize_t write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count);
```

This would mostly fuzz the kernel, not the Virtual Machine :(

We need something (much) lower level.

# Standard (low level) attack vectors

## **Ioport:**

outb, outw, outl, outsb, outsw, outsl,  
inb, inw, inl, insb, insw, insl, outb\_p,  
outw\_p, outl\_p, inb\_p, inw\_p, inl\_p

**Problems: sequence, multiple ports**

## **Ioctl:**

```
int ioctl(int d, int request, ...)
```

**Problems : arbitrary input size !**



How did we used to do it  
« back in the days » ?

MS Dos : direct access to the hardware  
(interrupts : BIOS, HD, Display, ...)

Can we get back to this ?

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

Introduced with Intel 386 (1985)

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

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Intel x86 cpus support 3 modes

- Protected mode
- Real mode
- System Management Mode (SMM)

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

---

## **Protected mode**

This mode is the native state of the processor. Among the capabilities of protected mode is the ability to directly execute “real-address mode” 8086 software in a protected, multi-tasking environment. This feature is called virtual-8086 mode, although it is not actually a processor mode. Virtual-8086 mode is actually a protected mode attribute that can be enabled for any task.

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

---

## **Real-address mode**

This mode implements the programming environment of the Intel 8086 processor with extensions (such as the ability to switch to protected or system management mode). The processor is placed in real-address mode following power-up or a reset.

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

---

## **System management mode (SMM)**

This mode provides an operating system or executive with a transparent mechanism for implementing platform specific functions such as power management and system security. The processor enters SMM when the external SMM interrupt pin (SMI#) is activated or an SMI is received from the advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC).

# Nice things about Real mode / Virtual 8086 mode

Direct access to hardware via  
interruptions !



## example:

Mov ah, 0x42 ; read sector from drive

Mov ch, 0x01 ; Track

Mov cl, 0x02 ; Sector

Mov dh, 0x03 ; Head

Mov dl, 0x80 ; Drive (here first HD)

Mov bx, offset buff ; es:bx is destination

Int 0x13 ; hard disk operation

# Complexity

$ax*bx*cx*dx$  (per interruption)

Id est:  $[0;65535]^4 \sim 1.8 * 10^{19}$

=> still huge


=> much better than `ioctl()`'s arbitrary input length !

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

Problem is... is this even  
possible inside a virtual  
machine ?

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode


A closer look at the boot sequence...



0x00:0x00




0x00:07c0



- Power supply initialize the clock
- Sends #POWERGOOD signal on bus
- CPU #RESETLINE
- POST Checks Performed with interrupts disabled
- IVT initialized

int 0x19



# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

---

The kernel boots in (16b) real mode, and then switches to protected mode (32b).

The cpu normally doesn't get back to real mode until next reboot.

# Introducing the Virtual 8086 mode

---

## Corollary

The hypervisor could run under any mode.  
protected mode in practice (being it ring0,  
ring1 or ring3).


All of the guests run only in protected  
mode.

---

Now how to switch to Virtual 8086 mode ? It  
this even possible ?



# Leaving protected mode ?



(Ascii Art : Courtesy of phrack 65)

Setting the VM flag in CR0 under protected mode would get us to Virtual Mode  
 Removing the PE flag from CR0 would get us back to real mode

# Leaving protected mode ?

---

linux-2.6.31/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c:

```
static const unsigned char real_mode_switch [] =
{
    0x66, 0x0f, 0x20, 0xc0,          /* movl %cr0,%eax */
    0x66, 0x83, 0xe0, 0x11,          /* andl $0x00000011,%eax */
    0x66, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, /* orl $0x60000000,%eax */
    0x66, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xc0,          /* movl %eax,%cr0 */
    0x66, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xd8,          /* movl %eax,%cr3 */
    0x66, 0x0f, 0x20, 0xc3,          /* movl %cr0,%ebx */
    0x66, 0x81, 0xe3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, /* andl $0x60000000,%ebx */
    0x74, 0x02,                       /* jz f */
    0x0f, 0x09,                       /* wbinvd */
    0x24, 0x10,                       /* f: andb $0x10,al */
    0x66, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xc0           /* movl %eax,%cr0 */
};
```

# Trouble is...

---

This obviously won't work inside a virtual machine !

Because CR[1-4] registers are themselves emulated

---

IS THIS « GAME OVER » ?

Actually not quite ...

Truth is : we don't need to  
switch back to real mode/  

---

virtual 8086 mode !

Most Operating systems offer a way to run  
16b applications (eg: MS DOS) under  
protected mode by emulating a switch to  
Virtual 8086 Mode.

Notably Windows (x86) and Linux (x86).

# The Windows case

---

NTVDM : ntvdm.exe  
« Windows 16b Virtual Machine »



Corbeille



Breaking  
virtualization by...

```
Administrateur : Invite de commandes - command.com
Microsoft Windows [version 6.0.6002]
Copyright (c) 2006 Microsoft Corporation. Tous droits réservés.

C:\Users\Administrateur>command.com
Microsoft(R) Windows DOS
(C)Copyright Microsoft Corp 1990-2001.

C:\USERS\ADMINI~1>
```

Démarrer

Administrateur : Invit...

FR



19:01

# The Linux case

---

The linux kernel provides an emulation of real mode in the form of two syscalls:

```
#define __NR_vm86old    113  
#define __NR_vm86      166
```



# The Linux case

---

```
#include <sys/vm86.h>
```

```
int vm86old(struct vm86_struct *info);
```

```
int vm86(unsigned long fn, struct  
vm86plus_struct *v86);
```

---

```
struct vm86_struct {  
    struct vm86_regs regs;  
    unsigned long flags;  
    unsigned long screen_bitmap;  
    unsigned long cpu_type;  
    struct revectored_struct  
        int_revectored;  
    struct revectored_struct  
        int21_revectored;  
};
```

# The Linux case

---

**linux-2.6.31/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:**

```
struct vm86_regs {
    long ebx;
    long ecx;
    long edx;
    long esi;
    long edi;
    long ebp;
    long eax;
    (...)
    unsigned short es, __esh;
    unsigned short ds, __dsh;
    unsigned short fs, __fsh;
    unsigned short gs, __gsh;
};
```

# In a nutshell

---

- The switch to Virtual mode is entirely emulated by the kernel (this will work inside a VM)
- We can still program using old school interruptions (easy !)
- Those interruptions are delivered to the hardware (id est: either the emulated one, or the real one).

**=> We just got a « bare metal (possibly virtualized) hardware interface »**

---

The x64 case...

# The x64 case

---

X64 cpus in 64b long mode can't switch to Virtual mode.

That's too bad : we'd like to fuzz latest Vmware ESX or Microsoft HyperV (necessarily under x64).

But under virtualization, the switch to VM86 mode is being emulated by the kernel...

# The x64 case

---

Using kernel patches, we can add VM86 capabilities to a x64 GNU/Linux kernel.

EG: <http://v86-64.sourceforge.net> to run Dosemu under x64.

What's not possible in real hardware becomes possible under a virtualized environment !

---

Practical use : Fuzzing using  
vm86()



# Practical use : Fuzzing using vm86()

Looking at the IVT allows us to fuzz all the hardware know after BIOS Post, efficiently (no calls to empty/dummy interrupts).


Practical use : Fuzzing using  
vm86()

Exemple bugs !

Practical use : Fuzzing using  
vm86()

Bugs in hypervisors...

# Virtualbox






---

**More (guest) bugs**

# Virtual PC



# Parallels (Guest)

---

----- Guest processor state -----

Inhibit Mask=0

CS=FF63 [0000FFFF 0000F30F] V=1

SS=FFD3 [0000FFFF 00CF9300] V=1

DS=0018 [0000FFFF 00CFF300] V=1

ES=0018 [0000FFFF 00CFF300] V=1

FS=FF9B [0000FFFF 00CF9300] V=1

GS=0018 [0000FFFF 00CF9300] V=1

EAX=000000A9 EBX=00005148 ECX=0000F686 EDX=0000000B

ESI=00002D72 EDI=000007E4 EBP=00002E99 ESP=00000FFA

**EIP=0000FE96** EFLAGS=00023202



---

**What about x64 ?**

# Attacking Microsoft HyperV

The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer application. The left-hand pane displays a tree view of event logs, with 'Summary page events' selected. The main pane shows a summary of one event, followed by a table of event details. Below the table, the event details for ID 14070 are expanded, showing a text description and a list of properties.

**Summary page events** Number of events: 1

Number of events: 1

Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Error	26/06/2010 22:30:00	Hyper-V-VMMS	14070	None

Event 14070, Hyper-V-VMMS

General Details

Virtual machine 'Ubuntu-fuzzing' (ID=C079C835-0249-49DE-8A5D-1FBFA50D7D57) has quit unexpectedly.

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-Hyper-V-VMMS/Admin  
Source: Hyper-V-VMMS      Logged: 26/06/2010 22:30:00  
Event ID: 14070      Task Category: None  
Level: Error      Keywords:  
User: SYSTEM      Computer: WIN-M5M10P60MNO  
OpCode: Info  
More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

---

**DEMOS**

# DEMO

---

Adding layers of virtualization is actually a bad idea : the only way is to secure the software is to properly test it for security bugs...

# Thank you for coming

---

## Questions ?

